


E
199
M4
1901

UC-NRLF



#B 469 525



EX LIBRIS

Manuscript

Battlefield Series N° 1.

MEMOIRS OF THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC

FROM

The Journal of a French Officer

EDITED WITH NOTES

BY


CAPTAIN R. GARDINER

QUEBEC

PRINTED BY THE NUNS OF THE FRANCISCAN CONVENT

AT THEIR PRESS ON THE PLAINS OF ABRAHAM

1901



Registered in accordance with the Copyright
Act. 1901

BATTLEFIELD SERIES N° 1

MEMOIRS OF THE SIEGE OF QUEBEC

Printed on the site of the Battlefield
from the copy in the possession of A. G. Doughty.

MEMOIRS OF THE
SIEGE OF QUEBEC

CAPITAL of ALL CANADA,

and of the RETREAT of

Monsieur de BOURLEMAQUE,

From CARILLON to the ISLE AUX NOIX

In Lake CHAMPLAIN.

FROM THE

JOURNAL of a FRENCH OFFICER

On Board the CHEZINE Frigate,

TAKEN BY HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP RIPPON.

Compared with the Accounts transmitted Home

By Major General Wolfe, and Vice-Admiral Saunders;

With Occasional Remarks.

By Richard Gardiner, Esq;

Captain of Marines in the Rippon.

In Joys of Conquest he resigns his Breath,
And, fill'd with ENGLAND'S Glory, smiles in Death,
ADD. Campaign.

LONDON :

Printed for R. and J. Dodsley, in Pallmall.

MDCCLXI.

(Price One Shilling and Six Pence.)

E 199

M4

1901

**Printed by the Nuns of the Franciscan Convent
Quebec, at their Press situated upon the site
of the battle of Sept. 13, 1759.**

To the memory of
WOLFE and MONTCALM

« Sunt lachryma rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt »

M253693



PREFATORY NOTE.

THIS scarce Journal of the Siege of Quebec is printed from a manuscript copy which was sent to me by Mr W. C. Lane, of Harvard University. The journal contains many details relating to the French camp which are not recorded by other writers of the period, and it is therefore of special value to students of Canadian history. The fact that it is reprinted for the first time by the Nuns of the Franciscan Convent, whose printing press is situated upon the ground once owned by Abraham Martin, after whom the Plains were named, and upon a portion of the actual battlefield, will no doubt be highly appreciated by those who desire to possess a souvenir of the famous Battle of the Plains.

A. G. DOUGHTY,

Quebec Sept. 1900

TO THE
HONORABLE
GEORGE HOBART, Esq ;

SIR,

AT the close of a successful Campaign, or after the surrender of a fortified Town or City, there is something singularly pleasing in hearing the account given by the enemy of the continual and constant apprehensions of the Garrison within the walls, during the progress of a Siege, and while it has been carrying on in Form ; how the Inhabitants have been affected upon every nearer Approach of an investing army ; how they felt along each wounded Line, and trembled at each widening breach ; in hourly alarms, and like the watchful mistress of the Web, though fierce in appearance, proud of the variety of her works,

and threatening defiance to every invader, yet inwardly diffident of their strength, and flying to her retired Hold on a more brisk and powerful assault than usual; how they formed on any motions actually made against them, or guarded and prepared against others expected to be made; what raised their hopes alternately, and what their fears; their consultations, and their resolutions: These are particulars more striking to the imagination than a perfect knowledge of our own designs, or a complete history of what passed in Camp or Trenches. The publick Prints in England are usually confined to the latter transactions only, and inform the reader what methods of attack were pursued on one side, but seldom what precautions were observed on the other, or whether we triumphed through superiority of courage and numbers, or through the neglect and inattention of the enemy; in a word, that the English won a battle, and the French lost it; that we took a town, not how they defended it, makes up the detail of most of our publick military descriptions: the knowledge of the former event is certainly the most material, but that of the latter is far from being unentertaining.

'Tis in this view I have presumed to lay the following sheets before you, as they may possibly contribute to amuse an idle hour in the country

(if any of yours can with propriety be called such) and at the same time introduce to your recollection a man at a distance from you, who ever so remotely employed in the publick service, has a heart still alive to the warm sensations of private friendships at home, and gratitude ever to think with pleasure on that in particular, which Mr. Hobart has honoured him with.

The Kingdom of France, perhaps was never more reduced in its naval power than at this æra of time before us; perhaps not in any one Period of its history whatever. It was a standing complaint against the late Cardinal Fleury, that during his long ministry, the Marine Department was entirely neglected; and that in Consequence of this inattention, at the breaking out of the last war, the French Navy was not only not upon a respectable footing, but was even held in contempt by the fleets of other nations, particularly by those of Spain and England, and was very unequal to support the Grand Monarque in the credit due to him as a Maritime Power; but the present low state and shattered condition of their marine is owing to a cause more glorious to our august sovereign, and his triumphant subjects to victory: Their ships are now diminished in their numbers, not from mismanagement in their Gallic State, but from British capture, from being subdued or destroyed from defeats repeated,

Conquest still following where e'er the flag of England flew, with a most amazing rapidity, in all parts of the known world: in short, the French are at this instant but seldom seen upon the Ocean, for this plain reason only, because they have been beat and burnt out of it by the English.

For some time past no line of battle ship has returned to France, that upon enquiry has not been found to have got in by stealth; if reinforcements are to be sent abroad to any of their few remaining settlements, are we not presently informed that some man of war has slipt out in the night, and luckily has escaped the Channel Cruizers, has run away in the dark, with her troops on board for the East or West Indies? Their ports are everywhere almost blocked up: their foreign trade not so much impaired as annihilated; their merchantmen all turned Privateers, and so in due Course of Time becoming English prizes; our men of war hourly insulting their coasts, riding at anchor in their harbours, pursuing their scattered fleets from bay to bay, and river to river; spreading terror and confusion throughout every province in the kingdom, burning their towns and forts, cutting out their ships from under their guns, driving others against the rocks, and making the very shore of France conspire to the ruin of its own navy, and

present destruction instead of refuge to the dispersed and flying squadrons of its sovereign.

Far be it from me to exaggerate the British power upon the watery element; but I believe that it is well known to be the true distressed state of the marine of France at this juncture, and his present Majesty, whose accession to the imperial crown of these his realms, so illustriously begins, and is so fair in prospect to add still greater honour to himself and glory to his people, has an undoubted right, if ever any British monarch had, or victorious fleets and armies can procure it, to oblige more nations than one to acknowledge his sovereignty on the ocean, and to strike to his royal flag in whatever seas or climates it may be met.

Whether this superiority over the grand disturber of Europe, in his naval strength, is owing to the great increase of riches and commerce in England of late years or whether the people in general may not have taken a more martial turn, and have been roused and animated by the continual insults and depredations of the common enemy, into a more glorious warmth and spirit of action, is not for me to determine; certain it is, that British courage may sleep for a while; but though it slumbers, it is only for a time, and will most assuredly awake whenever called upon in earnest: whatever is the cause,

the event is plain and obvious, and our pre-eminence at sea confessed by all the states and Potentates around us.

And here it might not be improper to mention the distinguished valour and intrepidity of his Majesty's officers and men in both services, as being perhaps in some measure conducive to this whole acquisition; but an officer writes with an ill grace upon so partial a subject; however, thus much it is possible may be said without offence, that hitherto but few of them have been found wanting in their most strenuous endeavours to promote the attainment of it, nor many of those employed abroad, discovered to be much inferior to the French in capacity and resolution, and once indeed have been so happy as to be told from the Throne, (a reward and recompense glorious beyond all others) that their behaviour had been such, as that the enemy for the future might learn "What troops they had to deal with" when they opposed his Majesty's arms in battle.

I have hinted this only in order, with your Indulgence, to take notice of a remark too frequently made, and a very severe censure it is upon military Gentlemen in general, that is, "That allowing them bravery, they still are deficient in their knowledge of the art of war, and by no means equal to the French in the latter respect, however superior they may be to them

„ in the former : ” the following sheets will, I hope, afford a noble, and I would willingly think a convincing proof to the contrary, and tend to root out a notion so long established, and so implicitly swallowed, to the disadvantage of our officers in the fleet and army ; whether we consider the conduct of the important expedition before us, on the land or sea side of the question ; whether we consider the great abilities, and thorough knowledge in his profession, required of a British admiral to steer his squadrons with safety in so intricate a navigation as that of the River of St. Laurence, and so little known to Englishmen ; where all lights and informations were to be had, and must be had, from the enemy themselves, and directions of every sort were to be borrowed from French charts, French observations, and French pilots : Or whether we consider the comprehensive judgment, penetration, presence of mind, and martial science, to be expected from a leader of troops, such as to promise, or even give faint hopes of success in so remote, uncultivated, inhospitable a country as that of Canada ; where rivers, woods, and mountains break off all communication ; where the very face of nature is set against the invader, and is strong as the strongest barrier ; where uncommon heats and (1) cold are in Alliance

(1) “ The excessive Coldness of the Climate, etc. insomuch

with, and fight for the adversary ; where a field of action is to be made, and to be found, to try your strength upon, and to give even a chance for victory ; and where, if by accident, an inconsiderable plain presents itself, wide enough for troops to enter upon action, entrenchments and redoubts forbid access ; where the foe lies buried up to the teeth, each avenue shut, and every pass securely fortified ; and this in a region where Britons having been known to fail before in their Attacks, had given fresh spirits to a vain-glorious enemy, who vaunted their forts and lines to be impregnable, provoking, not fearing an assault, and laughing at the quixotism of a British landing.

However, if oppressed and loaded with such uncommon difficulties, the British officers still made their way to conquest, returned home in triumph, receiving the applause of their country, rejoicing their sovereign, and bringing fresh laurels to crown his aged brow, blooming even from the wilds of America ; surely it is but common candor to believe, and allow, that men who thus succeeded, who thus triumphed, beyond all hope and opinion, surmounting obstacles judged to be insurmountable, and reaping such iron

that before the End of April 1000 were dead, above 2000 of what remained totally unfit for any Service."

Brigadier Murray's Letter from Quebec, May 25, 1760.

harvests of the field, could not be men very ignorant in their profession, or remarkably deficient in their knowledge of the art of war.

The navigation of the fleet was no less difficult and hazardous, as will more particularly appear from a view of the South channel of the River St. Laurence, even after our shipping had advanced securely above the very dangerous passage of the traverse at the end of the Isle of Orleans; the following observations which I have traced from a French chart found on board the *Chezine* will serve to illustrate this more clearly.

From the ENE. Point of Orleans to the SE. better than a mile, lie the Isles AUX ROTTS and Madame, between which and that of Orleans is situated the traverse at the opening of the two channels which lead up N. and S. of the Isle of Orleans, to Quebec.

The whole breadth of the River St. Laurence off the traverse from the North shore to the South, from cape Torment to Bertier, is only 3 leagues, depth of water 10 Fathom; and the broadest part of the south channel, which our ships went up by the side of the isle of Orleans, opposite to St. John's, one league only; and the narrowest half a league.

The whole of this channel is exceeding dangerous, and the passage up so nice, that it might with some propriety be considered as the princi-

pal outwork of Quebec, and in ordinary attacks more to be depended upon, than the strongest fortifications or defences of the town.

In the winding part of the S. Channel, from Beaumont over to the village of St. Laurence, in the Isle of Orleans, there runs out a sand three Quarters of a mile long, and the shore from side to side is barely two miles broad. This sand stretches up the channel from the ENE. to the WSW. along the New England shore for seven miles ahead, being one third of the navigation from the traverse to the points of Orleans and Levi, between which the English fleet afterwards anchored. The length of the Island of Orleans, from the ENE. point to the WSW. is about six French Leagues, and the broadest parts about two

From St. Bernabie, where the fleet first came to an anchor, up to the traverse, (a distance of 38 leagues) there is a number of shoals, sands, and little Islands interspersed; and here indeed the difficulty of navigation seems to commence; for the river of St. Laurence is pretty clear and open till the ships arrive off this cape, and the greatest danger to be dreaded is that of fogs, or the hard Gales of wind which may drive a fleet on S. or N. shore; as was the case in the expedition against Quebec in the Queen's time, under the command of Sir Hovendon Walker, and general Hill, (A. D. 1711.) where the British

squadron was run upon the Island of Eggs, which they could not weather, eight transports stranded with 884 men on board, and the whole, thro' the ignorance of the pilots and violence of the winds, in imminent danger of being lost.

The fogs were likewise very alarming to mariners, and very frequent in this river; so much so, that we ought to think ourselves extremely happy and much favoured by Providence, (which through the whole progress of the present war seems in a particular manner to have distinguished the justice of the British cause) that our naval officers were blessed with a clear serene sky and moderate weather to work their ships in, and to steer them from sand to sand and shoal to shoal, in the most difficult parts of the hazardous Channel, keeping their course direct, and sliding up to the very walls of the town without interruption or one fatal accident, without running on shore in one place, upon rocks in another, or even foul of their own ships; and guiding the helm with such exactitude and masterly skill, as if the guardian angel of the British Realms had itself conducted this most fortunate armament, and from every isle or Island, cape or point of land, which it was dangerous to approach, had timely warned the English Admiral, proclaiming aloud:

“Hither to shalt thou come, but no farther.”

The following beautiful lines of Claudian, if ever they were applicable to any man, were so in a particular manner to Mr. Saunders on this occasion :

O ! nimium dilecte DEO, qui militat æther,
Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti.

Success in so perilous a navigation will, I hope, incline the yet unprejudiced part of the world to imagine, that the officers of our fleet are likewise not unacquainted in their several and respective departments, nor at all inferior to the enemy in seamanship, and what relates to the head as well as the heart of bold, active, and experienced commanders.

Such and so great were the difficulties attending this extraordinary expedition in the first instance only, and before the troops could be brought into action, or even landed to make an attempt, so that when the whole of the operations of this campaign are taken into consideration, it may well be esteemed, and I think, impartially, the most arduous undertaking, and the most important achievement that has taken place since the beginning of this war; an expedition big with as interesting events, as perhaps was ever designed by an able and penetrating minister or carried into execution by a gallant and enterprising General; so as to leave the scrutinizing world and lookers on of all nations in suspense which

to admire most, the extensive genius of the one, or the matchless intrepidity of the other; the glorious offspring of which illustrious endeavours was the REDUCTION OF ALL CANADA to HIS MAJESTY'S OBEDIENCE, and the chastising the overbearing insolence of a proud, wary, restless and perfidious enemy, whilst it pleased Providence to bless the King's cause, and crown his arms with such a rapidity of success, and such a torrent of brilliant victories, as must forever distinguish the military prowess and awakened spirit of England in all martial history throughout the world.

I should now, Sir, apologize for the tedious length of this. Will it be allowed in excuse that, warmed with the delightful prospect of the glory of our country, I have suffered the pen to wander, nor stop'd its progress, while on a subject so transporting to a soldier and a Briton? In either of which lights should you think of me to advantage, my ambition is answered; for your approbation will always convey sufficient applause, and your friendship confer sufficient honour upon,

SIR,

From on board his
Majesty's Ship
Rippon, in Quiberon
Bay, Feb. 18, 1761.

Your most obliged and
obedient humble servant,

RICHARD GARDINER

The squadron under Sir Edward Hawke is now lying between the main land of France and the beautiful island of Belleisle; at a little distance from us to the ESE. is St. Gildas, a pleasant village, situated on an eminence which commands the Bay of Quiberon, Belleisle, the sea, the Cardinals, and several small islands; on the summit of the Hill stands the celebrated convent of the Paraclete, founded by Abelard and Eloisa, and walled in with extensive gardens to the southward; the situation is very delightful to the eyes, and the village (as I am informed) is in summer time a place of great resort.

MEMOIRS
OF THE
SIEGE OF QUEBEC

May 10, 20, 1759.

ON the 10th of May, 1759, Monsieur de Bougainville arrived at Quebec, from Old France, in the *Chezine*, Captain Duclos; soon after which we had an account of the arrival in the river of 15 merchantmen, under the convoy of Monsieur Kanou (1); and on the 20th counted 23 sail in the (2) bason of Quebec. These vessels came in very good time, for the English fleet was soon after them, and on the night of the 23d, the fires on Point Levi gave us notice of its approach to the (3) Bec. These signals were confirmed by a courier, who brought intelligence, that 14 Ships were already come to an anchor at St. Bernebie (4).

Note. — See references at the end.

Monsieur de Montcalm, who was then at Quebec, immediately dispatched an express to Monsieur de (5) Vaudreuil with this account, who instantly repaired to the garrison, and both generals made the necessary dispositions for a vigorous defence. Orders were given out for assembling the militia every where, and five battalions were sent for from Montreal (6); a body of horse, consisting of 200 men, were raised, and the command given to Monsieur de la Roche Beaucour. The Beauport side of the coast was fortified all along from the river St. Charles to the falls of Montmorency; a bridge of boats was built over this river, and the tete du Pont (or head of the bridge) defended by a hornwork: an entrenchment was thrown up in the prairie (or meadow) of Monsieur Hiche, which was carried on from St. Rock to the bridge; the entrance of the river St. Charles was secured by a boom, and this boom defended by two hulks with cannon, which were run ashore a little within the chain; several bateaux (or boats) were put upon the stocks, some of which were to carry a twelve, and others a fourteen pounder: a kind of (7) floating battery was likewise begun upon, of twelve embrasures to carry cannon of twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four pounders, and ninety men, and the command given to captain Ducloux of the Chezine, who was the inventor of it.

Batteries en barbette were erected on the quay du Palais, and those on the ramparts, and in the Lower town, were repaired, completed, and considerably enlarged. Eight vessels were likewise fitted out as (8) fireships, which did no execution, owing to the ill-management of the officers who had the direction of them: firestages were likewise built, but met with as little success as the ships. A street was opened in the garden of the Bishop's palace, for the easier communication between the town and ramparts: the passage that leads to lower town was blocked up, and the walls of the houses pulled down, that were adjoining to it. The breaches in the city walls were all filled up, and such of them as could not be finished with masonry, for want of time, were secured by a palisade, from any sudden attack (or coup de main). The ships which were not likely to be wanted during the siege were ordered up the river, as far as (9) Batiscan and all the seamen taken out, but such as were absolutely necessary for working them; the rest were employed at the batteries; and all persons who could be of no service in the siege, such as ladies and others, were desired to withdraw from the city; this request being considered by most people as an order, was submitted to, but not without reluctance.

June 26, 1759.

About the middle of June, advice was received that the whole of the English fleet was arrived at the Bec, and the wind at north east continuing to favor them, we soon learnt that they had passed all the dangerous shoals and had ground, and without any accident were safe at an anchor along the Isle of Orleans. The traverse, (10) a channel so difficult to cross, if our pilots are to be credited, was cleared without any trouble by the English squadron, notwithstanding the buoys were all cut away, and many of the ships ran over it, even in the night. The fleet of the enemy consisted of 160 sail. We counted sixteen of the line (of which three mounted eighty guns) and eight frigates; the rest were transports of different sorts. Vice-Amiral Saunders commanded the men-of-war, and major general Wolfe the troops destined to form the Siege, and which might in the whole amount to about 8 or 9000 effective men.

June 30, 1759.

The whole of our Army was assembled at Beauport, the last day of June, consisting of five battalions of regular troops, from 7 to 800 a battalion, the troops of the colony, and near an

equal number of Savages; the rest were only militia, and made up in the whole about 14000 men.

The right of the Camp was fixed near the Decoy, and the left extended to the Falls of Montmorency. The church of Beauport was in the center; on the left were encamped the battalion of Royal Roussillon, the Volunteers of Dubrel, the militia of Montreal, and all the Savages, under the command of the Chevalier de Levy.

Mr. Dumas commanded the right wing of the Army, which was composed of the militia of Quebec, and of the (11) Trois Rivières (or Three Rivers) whilst the troops of the Colony were divided between the left and right. Mr. de Senzergue, Brigadier general, commanded the center of the Camp, and had under his orders the battalions of La Sarre, Languedoc, Guyenne, and Bearn. The head quarters were fixed at the house of Mr. de Vienne, called La Mistanguienne. The garrison of the town was composed of the Burghers and the Seamen, in all about 2000. The troops and the Burghers rolled together, and did duty with one another, and the seamen and their officers were employed at the batteries under the command of the officers of the artillery. The troops in the garrison were relieved every four days from the Camp. A company of pioneers was likewise formed to carry on the necessary

works during the siege, under the direction of the Surveyor, or Builder of the King's ships.

Mr. de Ramesay, lieutenant de Roy, commanded in the town, and had under him Mr. le Chevalier le Berne, to whom the defence of the Lower Town was particularly entrusted.

June 30, 1759.

On the 30th of June, the enemy landed 3000 men at Point Levi, to oppose which body, a party of a hundred Savages only were detached from the camp, who (12) skirmished with them for a few hours, and then returned back, bringing with them about thirty scalps. Had a more considerable force been ordered out upon this service, sufficient to have brought on a serious affair, and to have ended it to our advantage, it certainly had been more for the interest of our generals; this indeed was proposed, but as it did not tally with the plan of defence agreed on, it was rejected and dropped: whatever was the reason, the English did not fail to turn it to good account; and to avail themselves of our inactivity on this occasion, which furnished them with an opportunity to fortify themselves on this side, and to erect batteries which played briskly on the town, and soon reduced it to ashes (13). They opened these batteries on the 12th of July in the night, which never ceased firing from that

time to the 18th of September; a day famous for the surrender of Quebec.

July 8, 1759.

The camp of Point Levi was scarcely fixed when (14) another was discovered of greater extent on the point of the Island of Orleans: but this last disappeared in a few days, and we observed a number of barges, (or flat-bottomed boats, full of soldiers) to enter the (15) north channel, and draw up under the cannon of the two frigates, which two days before came to an anchor opposite to the church of the (16) Guardian Angel. At first it was a doubt in our camp, whether this motion of the enemy had any real object or design, and under this false persuasion, that nothing could be attempted on that side, no measures were taken, either to prevent or disconcert their operations, or to make them purchase their success at a dear rate.

July 9, 1759.

General Wolfe observing no disposition on our side to dispute a landing made a (17) descent on the 9th of July in the morning, and in effect, met with no opposition, but from the Savages (18); these latter attacked a corps of 400 men, which they defeated; but this party being con-

siderably reinforced, the Indians were obliged to give way in their turn, and were driven off; they sent however to the Chevalier de Levy for assistance, but he arrived too late. This was not the only instance, in which the slowness of our motions was a service to the enemy.

General Wolfe finding no farther resistance to be made, took possession of the Heights to the left of the Falls of Montmorency, and which command all the country of the right; there fired his own camp, and fortified it with entrenchments towards the wood; he erected likewise a strong battery, which enladed and raked the camp of the Chevalier de Levy, and would have reduced him to the necessity of quitting it, had he not thrown up traverses (19) to secure it from the cannon. General Wolfe being master of the shore side to the left of the Falls of Montmorency, made no farther advances, the object he had in view was, to make an attack upon our camp (20); but the opposite banks of the river where he was obliged to cross, were so high and steep, and the little safety there was in passing a ford he had but a slender knowledge of, together with the number of thick woods which covered the country round, presented such a variety of difficulties to him, as were not easily to be surmounted; however by drawing our attention another way, and obliging us to (21) divide our

forces, he flattered himself, he should in the end accomplish his design.

July 18.

With this view, he caused (22) two ships to pass above the town of Quebec. This movement did not much alarm us at first, but others soon after taking the same route, and this little fleet increasing every day, our generals began to be (23) uneasy, and thereupon detached 1200 men from the camp to keep the enemy in awe on that side, and to prevent their making a descent.

Notwithstanding this precaution, Mr. Wolfe contrived to (24) land some troops at the Pointe aux Trembles, who (25) carried off some ladies, and conducted them on board the Amiral's ship. His Excellency received his prisoners very graciously, entertained them for two days, and then sent them back, greatly charmed with his politeness, and the genteel treatment they had met with.

This little squadron moved still higher up, and came to an anchor at the Falls of Richelieu (26), and from thence detached 800 men in flat-bottomed boats, who landed at Des Chambeaux (27), and marched directly to a house, where the cloathing and camp equipage of many of our officers were laid up, and set it on fire. Here they spread into the country, and collected toge-

ther a number of cattle, which they made a show of carrying off; but a body of twenty horses appearing unexpectedly, the English took fright, threw themselves into their boats with some precipitation, and returned on board their ships again.

All these transactions were attended with no events of consequence, and in no shape forwarded the main design of general Wolfe, who in the end took a (28) resolution to make an open and general attack upon our camp, and that in such manner as was most likely to finish the dispute between us. Accordingly the 31st of July was pitched upon as the day for this brilliant onset, and at nine o'clock in the morning, four vessels got on their way, and advanced towards the Point De Lesse. This is a low point near the Falls of Montmorency, and running out a little into the sea, presenting when the tide is out a very good field for action; on the shore (which rose in a kind of amphitheatre) our generals had thrown up entrenchment flanked with two (29) redoubts, one of which mounted cannon. Two of the sail just now mentioned ran in within the Point, and two others went aground on purpose above it; a fifth, which appeared to us to be a man-of-war of (30) 60 guns, came very near the former, but did not run ashore, and all three began a very brisk fire upon our entrenchments,

which lasted from eleven in the morning to seven o'clock at night (31). This fire was seconded by the batteries on the Falls, which, notwithstanding the traverses, galled our men more than the discharge from the shipping.

Soon after the cannonading took place, about a (32) hundred boats put off from the Point de Levi and made for the Isle of Orleans; it was then past all doubt, that an assault was intended. — The general was beat, and the whole of our troops marched out, and lined the (33) entrenchments from the center of the camp to the left. — The fire of the English was very smart; but our Canadians, tho' it was the first time they had ever seen the face of an enemy, remained unterrified, and stood to their arms with a steadiness, that greatly pleased our generals, and merited their applause.

About five o'clock in the afternoon, the (34) boats, which not without great difficulty had got the length of the Isle of Orleans, advanced towards the Point De Lesse, and there landed about 2000 men.

At that very instant appeared general Wolfe at the head of a column of 4000 men, which had passed the (35) ford at the Falls of Montmorency, and marched up to one of our redoubts, which he had abandoned for want of powder and ball; he gave orders to the (36) grenadiers to seize

upon this redoubt, but they were dislodged very soon by the fire of our musquetry, and obliged to retire in disorder, when the general, instead of rallying and bringing them back to the charge, ordered the (37) retreat to be beat.

The advantage which we had of the ground, and the good order he observed in our troops, probably inclined the English general to lay aside all thoughts of succeeding in this attack, and induced him to give up. Certain it is, that had he attempted to have forced our lines, his whole army would have run a risque of being (38) cut to pieces; for he must have carried the entrenchments by an escalad on three sides very difficult to be mounted, and that in the face of an army much (39) superior to his own.

We lost in the action 57 men killed and wounded, and the enemy about (40) 300. The seamen that belonged to the two ships that were aground, after (41) setting fire to them, retired to their boats.

August.

During the greatest part of the month of August, general Wolfe remained (42) inactive in his camp upon the Falls of Montmorency, and confined his operations to the burning and plundering of what houses there were in the country he was master of, waiting the arrival of the forces

under Mr. Amherst, before he made any new attempts; however, that general did not appear, and in the mean while, the season of action was slipping away, and Mr. Wolfe saw with regret, that his prey was ready to fall out of his hands; this determined him at all events to make one trial more, and to possess himself of the eminence on which Quebec is built.

In consequence of this resolution, he reinforced the squadron already above the town (43) raised his own camp upon the Falls, and removed it to the Point De Levi. This alteration produced a change in our camp. Troops were drawn off from the left wing which was now no longer in danger of any attack, and a recruit was sent to the right composed of a battalion of Guyenne, and a detachment of the Montreal militia.

Sept. 5.

Several days passed, and nothing material or of moment was observed to be in agitation; but on the 5th of September, several columns of the enemy were discovered marching upon the Heights of Point Levi, and taking the road that led to the Falls of Chaudiere (44), where they embarked on board the squadron.

This movement put it out of doubt, that the enemy had some design upon the (45) north

shore, and meant to possess themselves of some post there; of which immediate notice was sent to Mr. de Bougainville, who commanded in that quarter, and in the mean time, a reinforcement of five companies of grenadiers, the volunteers, and the picquets were detached to his assistance.

The north shore is nowhere accessible, especially to an army, but at Cap Rouge, Sillery St. Michael, and Le Foullon, where a convenient road was made, wide enough even for carriages.

Monsieur de Bougainville took his post with the whole of the troops under his command at Cap Rouge, as being a pass of the most consequence at this juncture; and contented himself with placing guards of 100 men each at every other post, and which would have been a strength sufficient against any attack, had the orders that were given out (of breaking up the roads every where) been put in execution, but the same fatality attended these, as did many other orders, that have been totally neglected.

General Wolfe, after marching and counter-marching, a number of feints and false alarms in different quarters, came at last to a resolution to make an attempt in earnest at Le Foullon, (46) and on the 12th of September at night, he landed 150 of the (47) Highlanders between St. Michael and Le Foullon, who with a great deal of (48) difficulty and danger climbed up to the summit

of the cape, which was immensely steep, and (49) fell upon the detachment that guarded that post of Fullon, and taking them in the rear: our soldiers thus surprised, scarcely entered into action, but abandoned their post and fled.

The English army having now no enemy in front to oppose them, scaled the path up the mountain without any difficulty, and soon gained the great road of St. Foy.

This landing was effected between the hours of 3 and 4 in the morning, but it was scarcely known in our camp at 6; and the first reports then were, that about a dozen flat-bottom'd boats had appeared off Le Foullon, and seemed to make a show of disembarking some people there; but very soon after, an express arrived with an account, that the whole of the English army had landed, and were advancing in good order along the road of St. Foy.

Immediately our troops quitted their camp, and filed off, leaving a guard of 1500 men only to defend it, and took post upon the (50) Heights of Abraham, waiting the arrival of the enemy, who were drawing up in order of battle near the house de Borgia, which covered their left; and from thence extended to the great road leading to the port of St. Louis.

General Wolfe, upon first coming up, had ordered a company of Highlanders to take

possession of the (51) house de Borgia; from which an attempt was made to dislodge them by our troops, and which brought on a brisk and obstinate attack; but all our efforts were to no purpose; as it was absolutely necessary to bring up cannon to drive them out.

The two armies did not long remain in view of each other, without coming to action; our troops shewed (52) great eagerness to engage, and intrepidity, but kept it up a very little time only; it was judged proper to take immediate advantage of this spirit; however, it had been more prudent to have waited the arrival of Monsieur de Bougainville, who was advancing with the flower of the army; but our generals thought they could do the business without him, and so marched up (53) to the enemy. Our troops gave the first fire, and those of the English the (54) second, and the affair was over; our right took to their heels, our center ran away after them, and drew along the left, and so the battle was lost in less time than I am telling the story.

An attempt was made to rally the runaways, but without effect; all that could be done, was to collect a body of 8 or 900 men together, whom they drew up in ambuscade in a (55) copse of wood upon the right of the Hills of Abraham, and whose fire retarded in some measure the pursuit of the conquerors; some others, who had

recovered from their fright, formed themselves into a few platoons, and made a stand, so that the action began to be renewed upon the declivity of the mountain in different parts; however, the fatal blow was struck, and the enemy triumphed.

We lost in this engagement between (56) 7 or 800 men killed and wounded. Monsieur de Montcalm died of his wounds the next morning; Monsieur de Senezergues was found dead upon the field of battle, and General (57) Wolfe survived his victory only four hours. Mr. Monckton, second in command, was wounded, but not dangerously.

At the close of this unhappy affair, Monsieur le Marquis de Vaudreuil assembled a Council of war, to which the principal officers were summoned. At this Council he declared his opinion, "That the troops should take their revenge the next morning, and endeavor to wipe off the stains they had contracted the foregoing fatal day"; this proposal, which seemed to carry a true sense of honour with it, ought never to have been rejected by (58) those gentlemen who receive their Sovereign's Pay, in order to maintain the spirit of honour; but so, however, it happened, and the united voice of all the members gave as their sentiments. "That there was an absolute necessity for the army to retire to the river (59)

of Jacques Cartiers, and the sooner it was done, the better, there being no time to lose." So the army broke up their camp that very evening, abandoning provisions, ammunition, baggage, and artillery, and marched all night to gain the Pointe aux Trembles, which was appointed the Rendez-vous for the whole.

Before he marched off, Monsieur de Vaudreuil dispatched an express to Monsieur le Chevalier de Levy, to give him intelligence of the dreadful catastrophe our troops had met with, and to desire him to come and take the command of the army upon him, in the room of Monsieur de Montcalm, who was dying. The courier found the Chevalier at Montreal, where he was just arrived, coming up a channel he had cut in the river of Cataracouy, to secure that part of the country, which was threatened with an invasion, from Sir Wiliam Johnson, the conqueror of Niagara.

Monsieur de Levy set out from Montreal, immediately upon the receipt of the letter, and arrived at Jacques Cartiers the 16th of September. After a few hours conference with the Marquis de Vaudreuil, it was agreed between them, to write to Monsieur de Ramsay, governor of the town of Quebec, to acquaint him, " That a resolution was taken to march to his relief; that
"after the next day, the whole army would

“be in motion; that a disposition was made to “throw a considerable supply of provision into “the town; and, in a word, to encourage him by all means to hold out to the last extremity (60).”

The courier on his arrival at Quebec found the capitulation already in train (61), and a Treaty entered into and carrying on between Monsieur de Ramsay and the Besieging general: one would have imagined that the Marquis de Vaudreuil's letter would have broke off, or at least suspended a while, the issue of this negotiation; but whether the orders it contained, were not precise or explicit enough, or whether Monsieur de Ramsay had reasons of his own, which weighed more with him than his instructions from Monsieur de Vaudreuil, is an affair not very certainly known.

Sept. 18.

The Treaty however continued, and the Capitulation signed on both sides the 18th of September, at the English camp before Quebec.

NOTES

1. — For a List of the Convoy under Monsieur Kanou, see the last page of these Memoirs.

2. — The Bason before Quebec, from the South Shore to the North, opposite to the village of Charlebourg, is about two miles and a half broad.

This Bason is formed by the two Channels of the River St Laurence (called the North and South Channel) which empty themselves into it, and unite before the Town; after this Confluence the river runs up above the Town in one Channel only, to the S. W. leading to Montreal &c. but the Stream sets to the N. E.

Quebec stands on a Point of land on the North Shore, projecting towards the Bason and the Isle of Orleans.

3. — The Bee, or Bic, is a small Island in the River St Laurence, distant from Quebec and Point Levi (which is opposite to it) about forty-three French Leagues.

4. — St Bernabie is about three leagues lower down from the Bec, to the W. N. W.

5. — Le Marquis de Vaudreuil, Grand Croix of the royal and military order of St Lewis, was Governor and Lieutenant-General for the French King, in Canada, and usually resided at Montreal.

6. — Montreal is a large fortified Town, situated upon an Island in the river St Laurence, about 180 miles higher up, and to the Southward of Quebec. It is called Montreal at pre-

sent (or *Mont Royal*) from a very high mountain that overlooks the Island ; but formely, and indeed originally, it bore the name of *Ville Marie*, or *Mary's Town*. The River of *St Laurence*, at *Montreal*, is about three miles broad, but it is not navigable beyond for rocks and cataracts.

The Province of *Canada*, or *New France*, of which *Quebec* was considered as the *Capital*, is situated about 70 and 105 long. W. and between 39 and 58. Lat. N. is according to the latest computations 1800 miles long, and 1260 broad ; bounded by *New Britain* and *British Canada* on the North ; by *New Scotland*, *New England*, and *New York*, on the East ; and by unknown lands on the West.

7. — To the uncommon strength of the country, the enemy have added (for the defence of the river, a great number of floating batteries and boats. Letter from Major General *Wolfe*.

8. — Seven of these *Fire-Ships* were sent down from *Quebec*, at mid-night, the 28th of *June*, upon our men of war and transports, but were all towed ashore by the boats of the Squadron, without doing any mischief, notwithstanding the fleet was so numerous, and spread so great a part of the Channel ; the next night General *Monckton* landed with his Brigade, and took possession of *Point Levi*. Letter from Vice Admiral *Saunders*, Sept. 5.

9. — *Batiscaun* lies about 20 leagues above the town ; Admiral *Holmes* went up with his division ten or twelve leagues, in order to destroy them, but could get no farther.

10. — The *TRAVERSE* lies at the E. or N. E. End of the *Isle of Orleans*, about twenty miles below *Quebec*, where the *River St Laurence* divides itself into two Channels, one running on the North, and the other on the South side of *Orleans*. The breadth of the river, from shore to shore, from *Cape Torment*

to Bertier, is about nine miles, but the mouth of the South Channel, which our fleet passed at the traverse, is choaked up with a number of rocks, and sands, and little islands. From the N. E. End of it, at the distance of four leagues to the S. W. are sands and rocks running up for twelve miles to the Isle Vertu, which is two leagues long ; opposite to this is another island, guarded with a round sand, bigger and broader than itself considerably, being only a mile and a half long, called the Isle Rouge ; the passage for the fleet, between these two Islands, is a league and a half broad.

From the Isle Rouge, proceeding on to the S. W. about four leagues, is situated the Isle au Lievre, the approach to which, on the North side, is prevented by a sand five miles long, and three quarters broad, with a rock in the middle of it ; on the South side are three little rocks, and from the middle of this island to the S. W. End of it, runs a sand twelve miles long, and three broad, with three rocks in it. Opposite this sand, to the southward, are four rocks, and a sand with five more rocks a little higher up upon it ; the passage for the shipping between these two sands, to the south of Lievre, is about a league broad, and on the North side of the Island but half a one : This sand extends above fifteen miles from below Les Pelleciera up to Cape Camoras, and higher.

About seven miles farther up, a broad oval sand runs almost across the river, within three miles of Cape au Oye, on the opposite shore ; the river is here about ten miles broad, seven of which are covered with this sand, to the westward of which is another sand and rock, and the Island of Au Coudre, the passage open to the fleet between them not being broader than one mile and a half.

From the Isle Au Coudre up to the traverse is one continual

and wide extended sand lying in the middle of the river, full of rocks, stretching thirty miles in length, and better than two leagues broad in some parts of it. The passage on each side for the Squadron, in the narrowest part, is only a mile and a half, on the North side it is scarce a mile.

This sand with the little Isles aux Rots, Madame, and the sands interspersed around them, lead the approach to the Island of Orleans, and the mouth of the South Channel to Quebec at the traverse ; and from the traverse up to Quebec the Navigation is already mentioned in the dedication.

From Point Levi all along the coast to the mountains of Our Lady, on the south shore, a distance of about 120 Miles, are situated a number of towns and villages, and a greater still in proportion to the distance, on the Canada or North side.

11. — The Trois-Rivieres is a Government on the North shore, near half-way between Quebec and Montreal ; the Capital of this Government bears the same name, but is only an open straggling village.

12. — “ The advanced parties upon this occasion had two or three Skirmishes with the Canadians and Indians, with little loss on either side. ” General Wolfe’s Letter.

13 — “ Batteries of Cannon and Mortars were erected with great dispatch on the Point of Levi, to bombard the Town and Magazines, and to injure the works and batteries. ”

“ The effect of this artillery has been so great (tho’ across the river) that the Upper Town is considerably damaged, and the Lower Town entirely destroyed. ” Wolfe.

The Breadth of the river from the English batteries to the Lower Town and Citadel, was about three quarters of a mile : the Batteries consisted of 12, 24, and 32 pounders with seven mortars. Brigadier Monckton, who commanded at Point Levi,

had fortified his camp with several redoubts, and a battery of two guns upon the Point itself.

General Wolfe mentions an attempt of the enemy to destroy these works, who sent out a detachment of 1600 men for that purpose, but falling into confusion, they fired upon one another and went back again.

14. — Col. Carleton marched with a detachment to the Westernmost Point of the Isle of Orleans.

It was absolutely necessary to possess these two points and fortify them, because from either the one or the other, the enemy might make it impossible for any ship to lye in the Basin of Quebec, or even within two miles of it. Wolfe.

15. — “ It being resolved to land on the North Shore, below the Falls of Montmorency, I placed on the 8th instant (July) his Majesty’s Sloop the Porcupine and the Boscawen armed vessel, in the Channel between Orleans and the North Shore to cover the landing.” Letter from Admiral Saunders.

16. — About three miles from the River and Falls of Montmorency, lower down the North Channel.

17. — We passed the North Channel at night, and encamped near the enemy’s left, the River Montmorency between us.

Wolfe

18. — “ The next morning (after landing) Captain Dank’s Company of Rangers, posted in a wood to cover some workmen, were attacked and defeated by a body of Indians, and had so many killed and wounded, as to be almost disabled for the rest of the campaign ; the enemy also suffered in this affair and were in their turn driven off by the nearest troops.” Wolfe.

19. — Banks of earth thrown perpendicularly across a line to intercept the enemy’s shot, and to prevent its being raked.

These traverses are some sometimes six or seven feet high,

especially if the line is commanded by any Eminence, and about 12 or 18 feet thick, so as to be Cannon Proof; a communication is preserved at one end of the traverse by leaving a passage five or six feet wide.

20. — “I had hopes that possibly means might be found of passing the river above, so as to fight the Marquis De Montcalm upon terms of less disadvantage, than directly attacking his entrenchments. Wolfe.

“In reconnoitring the river Montmorency, we found it fordable at a place about three miles up, but the opposite bank was intrenched, and so steep and woody, that it was to no purpose to attempt a passage there.” Wolfe.

21. — “However to divide the enemy’s force, &c” Wolfe.

22. — “On the 17th, I ordered Captain Rous of the Sutherland to proceed with the first fair wind and night-tide above the Town of Quebec, and to take with him his Majesty’s Ships Diana and Squirrel with two armed sloops, and two catts loaded with provisions, and on the 18th they all got up except the Diana, and gave General Wolfe an opportunity of reconnoitring above the Town.” Saunders.

23. — I thought of attempting it (to land) at St Michael’s about three miles above the Town, but perceiving that the enemy were jealous of the design, were preparing against it, &c. it seemed so hazardous, that I thought it best to desist. Wolfe.

24. — I sent a detachment under the command of Colonel Carleton to land at the Point De Trempe to attack whatever he might find there, bring off some prisoners, and all the useful papers he could get.

25. — The Colonel brought off some prisoners, and returned with little loss. Wolfe.

26. — At the Falls of Richelieu on the South Shore, nearly

opposite to De Chambaud, about 24 miles above the Town of Quebec.

27. — This landing at Des Chambeaux was not effected till after the action of the 31st of July.

“Immediately after this Check (July 31st) I sent Brigadier Murray above the Town with 1200 men &c. He landed unexpectedly at De Chambaud, and burnt a magazine there, in which were some provisions, some ammunition, and all the spare stores, cloathing, arms and baggage of their army.” Wolfe.

28. — “I now resolved to take the first opportunity which presented itself of attacking the enemy, &c.” Wolfe

“Previous to this engagement of the 31st, the enemy had sent down on the 28th at midnight, a raft of Fire-Stages, of near a hundred Radeaux ; which succeeded no better than their Fire-Ships already mentioned.” Saunders.

29. — A redoubt is a work thrown up for the security of lines and entrenchments, consisting generally of three, four, or more sides, surrounded, with a bank and ditch, and mounting cannon ; it is a temporary fortification, and mostly used for the defence of a camp, or some post of consequence.

30. — “To cover (the troops on landing) I placed the Centurion in the Channel between the Isle of Orleans and the Falls (of Montmorency) and ran on shore at high water, two catts, which I armed for that purpose, against two small batteries and two redoubts, where our troops were to land.” Saunders.

The fire of this ship was of great service, particularly in silencing in a great measure the battery of the enemy which commanded the Ford at the Falls, where the two Brigades of General Murray and Townshend were to pass in order to attack the left of the French army.

31. — “ A great quantity of Artillery were placed upon the eminence, so as to batter and ensilade the left of their entrenchments. ” Wolfe.

32. — “ The Boats of the Fleet were filled with Grenadiers, and a part Brigadier Monckton’s Brigade from the Point of Levi. ” Wolfe.

33. — The entrenchments ran all along the shore from the River St Charles to the Ford at Montmorency, and were defended by nine redoubts and ten batteries with a mortar near Beaufort ; mounting in all thirty-three guns ; the batteries were within less than a quarter of a mile of one another, that is, within Musquet Shot ; for tho’ the Point Blank Flight of a musquet ball is generally computed at no more than 260 yards, yet a very little elevation of the musquet will do good execution at a distance of 360. The Floating battery of 12 guns was placed at the mouth of the River St Charles.

34. — With Brigadier Monckton’s Detachment from Point Levi.

35. — The Breadth of the Ford at the Falls at Montmorency was about 150 yards ; the Falls of Montmorency were 300 feet high.

36. — Grenadiers were ordered to form themselves into four distinct bodies and to begin the attack, supported by Brigadier Monckton’s Corps, as soon as the troops (under Mr Townshend and Murray) had passed the Ford, and were at hand to assist ; but instead of forming themselves as they were directed, they ran on impetuously towards the enemy’s entrenchments in the utmost disorder and confusion, without waiting for the corps which were to sustain them, and join in the attack, &c.

“ The Grenadiers were checked, and obliged to shelter themselves in or about the redoubt, which the French abandoned upon their approach. ” Wolfe.

(Not very likely for want of Powder and Ball.)

37. — I saw the absolute necessity of calling them off, that they might form themselves behind Brigadier Monckton's Corps.

It was near Night, a sudden storm came on, and the tide began to make, so that I thought it most adviseable not to persevere in so difficult an Attack. Wolfe.

38. — "If the Attack had succeeded, our Loss must certainly have been great." After which the General gives his reasons for this severe Attack; "The desire to act in Conformity to the King's Intentions, induced me to make this Trial." and closes his Account of it, with an Opinion that does Honour to the Troops under his Command, a Confidence in them. and Conviction that breathes the true Martial Spirit of that active and intrepid Leader, "persuaded that a victorious Army finds no Difficulties." A Position that not only deserves to be adopted and embraced by every succeeding Officer at the Head of Troops, but to be laid down and admitted as an Axiom in Military Theory, and which the Experience of all Ages must forever confirm.

39. — "The Enemy were indeed posted on a commanding Eminence, numerous in their Intrenchments, and their Fire hot." Wolfe.

40. — Killed. Officers 11, and 171 Men. Wounded, Officers 46, and 604 of the Men. Missing, Rank and file 17. In all 849. Wolfe.

41. — "To prevent the two Catts from falling into the Enemy's Hands (they being then dry on Shore) I gave Orders to take the Men out, and set them on Fire, which was accordingly done." Saunders.

42. — General WOLFE and the ADMIRAL were far from being inactive all this Month. "On the 5th of August, I sent twenty flatbottomed Boats up the River, to embark 1260 of the

Troops. I sent up Admiral Holmes, and directed him to use his best Endeavours to get at and destroy the Enemy's Ships above the Town, but the Wind holding Westerly, it was the 27th of August before they got up." Saunders.

"I sent Rrigadier Murray above the Town with 1200 Men; directing him to assist Rear Admiral Holmes in the Destruction of the Freuch Ships (if they could be got at) in order to open a communication with General Amherst." Wolfe.

"Before Admiral Durell got into the River, three Frigates and 17 Sail with Provisions, Stores, and a few Recruits, got up, and are those we are so anxious if possible to destroy." Saunders.

This was the little Fleet under Monsienn Kanou that arrived from Old France the beginning of May, one of which was the Chezine as already mentioned.

43. — General Wolfe being resolved to quit the Camp at Montmorency, and having taken off all the Artillery, on the 3rd of September, the Troops embarked thence and landed at Point Levi. Saunders.

44. — Nearly opposite to Cape Rouge, which is about five Miles above Quebec, and about nine above Sillery where the Troops landed.

45. — On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, a Movement of the Ships was made, in order to amuse "the Enemy now posted along the North Shore." (viz, Monsieur Bougainville's Command.) Brigadier Townshend's Letter.

46. — Within a League of Cape Diamond.

Cape Diamond is situated to the Southward of the Town, and runs out into the River at the Distance of about a Quarter of a Mile from the Citadel. There was a Battery erected upon it called the Queen's Battery, but there were no Guns mounted.

47. — The Light Infantry.

48. — “ When General Wolfe, and the Troops with him had landed, the Difficulty of gaining the Top of the Hill is scarce credible ; it was very steep in its Ascent and high, and had no Path where two could go abreast ; but they were obliged to pull their selves up by the Stumps and Boughs of Trees that covered the Declivity. ” Saunders.

49. — “ After a little Firing, the Light Infantry (under Colonel Howe) gained the Top of the Precipice, and dispersed the Captain’s Post. ” Townshend. (100 Men detached by Monsieur de Bougainville from Cape Rouge to defend the Ascent of Sillery.)

50. — The Heights of Abraham, where the French Army drew up, are scarcely half a Mile from the Works of the Town to the S. W.

51. — “ The Houses, into which the Light Infantry were thrown, were well defended. ” Townshend.

52. — It is most certain that the Army (French) formed in good Order, and that their Attack was very brisk and animated. Townshend.

53. — It was seemingly but ill judged of the French Generals to rush on to an Attack, without waiting for the Arrival of Monsr. de Bougainville, could they have prevented coming to Action, especially if what is here advanced be true, that he had the Picked Men or Flower of their Troops with him ; add to this, his Situation was such, that, according to Mr, Townshend, the English Army must of Necessity have been put between two Fires. (“ Scarce was this effected, when M. de Bougainville with his Corps from Cape Rouge, of 2000 Men, appeared in our Rear. ” Townshend.)

By General Wolfe’s Letter of the 5th of September, when this Landing was only in Agitation, and seemed to be intended as

the Finishing Stroke of the Campaign, the English Army amounted to no more than 4 or 5000 effective Men; ("after the Points of Levi and Orleans were left in a proper State of Defence.") a very unequal Match for the French in Point of Numbers, even in any Situation, and much less so in the present one, and of which Brigadier Townshend seemed so very sensible, that when the Command devolved upon him by the much lamented Fall of General Wolfe, his first Employment, even after the Victory obtained, and the Rout of the Enemy, was to secure his Camp. ("I have been employed, from the Day of Action to that of the Capitulation, in redoubling our Camp beyond Insult. Townshend.)

'Tis probable, a Contempt of our Numbers, and a fancied Security of Success on that Account, might betray the Marquis De Montcalm into this rash Engagement, and which was very little consistent with his usual Coolness and Wisdom; for he seems in Mr. Wolfe's own Opinion, (who certainly was no mean Judge) to have been an able and experienced Officer: ("The Obstacles we have met with, in the Operations of the Campaign, are much greater than we had Reason to expect, or could foresee; not so from the Number of the Enemy, (though superior to us) as from the natural Strength of the Country, which the Marquis De Montcalm seems wisely to depend upon." Wolfe.) He never could have been lead into this Attack by any extraordinary Confidence he had in the Troops of the Colony and the Savages, for he must know the Canadians too well to risk a Battle, because they were in Spirits, and their Courage was up, as is insinuated here; but the Advantage of the Ground, the superior Extent of his Line, the Sight of the English Army before the Town, Vexation at finding himself out-generall'd, his Lines and Batteries, his intrenched Camp and formidable

Redoubts become of no use, Surprise, Desire of Revenge, Thirst of Glory, Honour of the French Arms, Anger or Disappointment, might all concur to hurry him on to immediate Action, and without waiting for any farther Addition to his Forces to fall upon the Enemy drawn up before him.

Whatever was the Inducement, the Event plainly shewed it a very indiscrete Onset, and such a one as might have ended in the total Destruction of the French Army, without affording an Opportunity for a second Trial; for, had the Town of Quebec been situated at a greater Distance from the Field of Battle, they must all have inevitably been cut to Pieces, or reduced to the melancholy Necessity of laying down their Arms. ("If the Town had been further off, the whole French Army must have been destroyed." Saunders.)

54. — Our Troops reserved their Fire till within forty Yards, which was so well continued, that the Enemy every where gave way. Townshend.

"The Enemy began the Attack, our Troops received their Fire, and reserved their own till they were so near as to run in upon them, and push them with their Bayonets; by which, in a very little Time, the French gave way and fled to the Town in the utmost Disorder and with great Loss; for our Troops pursued them quite to the Walls, and killed many of them upon the Glacis of the Ditch." Saunders.

55. — "Part of the Enemy made a second faint Attack: part took to some thick Copse Wood, and seemed to make a Stand. Townshend.

56. — "Their Loss (of the Enemy) is computed to be about 1500 Men, which fell chiefly upon the Regulars." Townshend.

57. — On the Side of the British were killed only nine Officers; but One of these nine (a Loss almost irreparable to the English

Nation) was the Gallant General himself, whose Name can only be forgot, when Quebec can be no more remembered.

One Captain, six Lieutenants, and one Ensign fell likewise in the Action, with 545 Rank and File.

Wounded, Officers 53, Serjeants 95, 4 Drummers, 506 Rank and File ; in all — 648.

58. — The Marquis De Vaudrueil, tho' Governor and Lieutenant-General for the King in Canada, was not regularly in the Army, upon the Officers of which only this Reflection seems to be intended.

59. — Jacques Cartiers appears to have been a very strong Post; Mr. Murray, in his Account of the Raising of the Siege of Quebec, speaks of it in that Light, "They (the Enemy) left their Camp standing, and have retired to their former Aylum, Jacques Cartiers." It is situated about twenty Miles above Quebec.

60. — "By Deserters we learn that Monsieur De Levi is come down from Montreal ; some say, he has brought two Battalions with him, and that M. De Bougainville with 800 Men and Provisions was on his March, to fling himself into the Town the 18th, the very Morning it capitulated." Townshend.

61. — This was exactly the Case at Guadaloupe, in the West Indies, the same Year ; Monsieur De Bompar, the French Admiral, had actually landed a Reinforcement of 2000 Men, and a Supply of Arms, upon the Island, the very Day it surrendered to General Barrington ; which Disembarkation, had it taken place about 24 Hours sooner, must inevitably have preserved the Colony, and the English Troops would have been obliged to have returned on board the Transports again, being at this Time so reduced in their Numbers, from Service and Sickness, that it would have been impossible for the General to have opposed this new Body, or to have acted Offensively any longer upon the Island with a Probability of Success.

Gaylamount
Pamphlet
Binder
Gaylord Bros., Inc.
Stockton, Calif.
T. M. Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.

M253693

E199
M4
1901

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

